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The operation of an accelerator presents a very particular risk; exposure to
radiation either directly from prompt radiation during operation or from
induced radiation during tunnel access. The access to the machine tunnels is
therefore fully controlled.
Moreover, all the buildings also present various risks, depending on the
laboratories and other installations that they may contain and by the presence
of people 24h a day. The premises are then under supervision.
In order to provide full control of all these risks, different systems of
interlocks, locking, monitoring and detection have been installed at the ESRF
which send all the information to the Control Room.
In collaboration with the Safety Group, specific procedures have been





The European Synchrotron Radiation Facility (ESRF) is an X-ray source of the third generation. The
accelerator complex is composed of a Linear accelerator (e- 200 MeV), a synchrotron (300 metres –
6 GeV) and a Storage Ring (844 metres).
The ESRF accelerators have been in full routine operation for more than six years. The source
delivers 5600 hours of X-ray beam to nearly 40 beam lines simultaneously. Our first goal is to ensure
good availability of the Machine as well as a satisfactory Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) all
together in safe conditions.
 
2. THE DIFFERENT ASPECTS OF SAFETY AT ESRF
2.1 Fire
 
Almost every room throughout the buildings is equipped with one or several detection heads.
Depending on the nature of the risk, the sensor may be of anionic, thermostatic or UV type. There are




Many pieces of equipment installed on the site are water-cooled. They are of course protected by over
temperature and/or flowmeter interlocks in case of a water cooling system failure, but the bursting of a
pipe or a hose may lead to major damages if the fluid is spread over equipment. It may also bring the
water distribution system to a stop because of a low level in the network. A flooding detection system is
installed in all the tunnels, the beam lines and in the rooms containing the main Machine dedicated
equipment.
The geographic situation of the Facility, where two rivers join, and its construction altitude





The size and the configuration of the ESRF site have made the installation of a Red Phone network
mandatory ever since the construction of the Facility. The objective is simple: to be able to contact the
Control Room very easily in case of any emergency need (fire, faintness, accident etc…). There are




All central computer resources are concentrated in one room. The equipment in this room is
indispensable for the running of the ESRF; a shutdown of the network equipment or any of the server
computers immediately disturbs the work of a Group, a Division or even the entire Facility. A failure of
the air conditioning unit would create an increase of the ambient room temperature and may lead to a
severe control system crash. Any temperature increase triggers an alarm in the Control Room.
 
2.5 Interventions scheduling and co-ordination
 
The numerous types of equipment are subject to upgrade, modification, repair or preventative
maintenance. Most of these duties are undertaken during the Machine Shutdowns, planned one year in
advance but may take place at anytime in case of failure or breakdown. In order to optimise the
interventions in terms of safety, resources and quality during the Machine Shutdown, the Operation
Group takes over the co-ordination of the tasks.
 
2.6 Safety related with X-ray source
 
The general Radiation Protection policy at the ESRF stipulates that everybody working at the ESRF is
considered as a non-exposed worker. Therefore, under all conditions one must guarantee that nobody
exceeds the corresponding radiation limits (1 mSv per year). This is obtained via appropriate shielding
of all accelerator tunnels and of the X-ray beam lines, and via all the corresponding Personnel Safety
Systems. One particular aspect is the radiation hazard created by induced activity, limited exclusively to
the accelerator tunnels. For this purpose, the Operations Group co-ordinates a system of work permits.
Before entering any accelerator tunnel, a radiation survey must be made of the induced activity in the
area concerned. This survey is made by the Safety Group (start of main shutdown, important
intervention) or by the Operators (routine intervention during Controlled Access). As a result of these
surveys specific safety procedures are elaborated.
 
3. THE ROLE AND THE TOOLS OF THE OPERATION GROUP TO HANDLE SAFETY
3.1 Fire Detection System
 
Every alarm trigger, following either a real detection of smoke or a failure of the detection system, is
reported to the Control Room. The message written on the screen gives the identity of the head
triggered or the faulty device, the name of the building and the number of the room. An application
made on a SuperCard by the Operators and installed on a computer in the Control Room enables the
fast localisation of the triggered detector, by going through windows from the number of the detector to
the plan of the building and the room concerned.
Different procedures, depending on the time of the day and the status of the Machine (run or
shutdown), are available in the control room in a form of a flowchart. They describe the steps to follow,
and give all the relevant information to the Operator on shift; from the verification of the alarm on the
spot to the initiation of the proceedings for the evacuation of the building, the call to the Fire Brigade
and to the on-call Safety Engineer.
A fire permit is mandatory to perform any work that may produce smoke and trigger a sensor
(welding, grounding, etc…). A copy of any delivered fire permit is posted in the control room; in case
of a fire alarm, the Operator can verify if it comes from the concerned works or not.
 120
 
3.2 Flooding Detection System
 
It consists of a sensitive cable laid on the accelerator tunnel floor and linked to a controller, which
permanently measures its conductivity. In the case of fluid detection on the cable, the controller triggers
an alarm and, via a computer, gives an approximate distance that facilitates the localisation of the leak.
In the other critical rooms, such as beam lines and main power supply cubicles for instance, the
detection system is made of optical detectors.
In the case of an alarm, the Operator will enter the zone to investigate the problem. A procedure
gives the Operator the steps to follow to ensure his own safety from a radiation protection and an
electrical point of view and to protect the equipment. Depending on the seriousness of the failure, the
Operator will carry out the repair himself or call the on-call Maintenance Technician.
 
3.3 Red phone System
 
As soon as somebody picks up any red phone anywhere on the site, or dials 10 from any other
telephone set to report any kind of incident, he is automatically connected to the red phone receiver
located in the control room. An on-line printer keeps track of all the emergency calls and gives precious
information as to the location of the phone call. An application based on the same principle as for the
fire detection system will be developed in the forthcoming months.
A checklist guides the Operator during the call to get all the relevant information from the caller.
The corresponding procedure is then applied, depending on the nature of the call.
All the Operators are trained to above all to help any injured person, in the frame of his working
environment; depending on the situation. The Operator on shift may decide on the spot to go and give
the victim assistance, whilst waiting for the Emergency Aid Brigade.
 
3.4 Interventions scheduling and co-ordination
 
A few weeks before the shutdown, the list of the interventions foreseen by every Equipment Group
Leader is sent to the Operation Group Co-ordinator. He will then elaborate a detailed schedule, listing
the tasks to be undertaken, taking into account the different constraints raised by the nature of the work
such as handling, bake out, alignment, electrical and fluids cut-offs etc… The proposed schedule is
accessible via the internet and submitted to all concerned people. It is regularly updated before and
during the shutdown.
At the start of the Machine Shutdown, the Safety Group performs a Radiation Protection survey
inside all the tunnels. From the measurements taken during this inspection, a Radiation Map showing
the zones containing activated equipment is drawn up by the Operation Group and posted in all the
access chicanes of the Machine. Depending on the type of intervention to be performed on the
equipment, their electrical power supplies may be subject to a partial or complete ‘consignation et mise
à la terre’.
For any intervention planned inside the tunnels, a Work Permit Form must be filled in by the
Intervention Responsible and submitted to the Operation Group and the Safety Group for approval. The
permit contains the description of the intervention, the place and the names of the people in charge of
the works. It provides information about safety-related actions or requirements such as shielding
dismounting radiation exposure limitation or electrical insulation. A copy of the Radiation Map is
attached to every work permit.
The Co-ordinator assumes the follow-up of the activities carried out during the Shutdown and
reshapes the schedule in accordance with any modification. The Operator on shift or on a normal day
assists the Co-ordinator during the day and carries out a safety round during the night and the weekend.
He will pay particular attention to the zones where bake out is being performed.
At the end of the shutdown, once all the work permits are recovered by the Operators, a safety
round is performed by the Safety Group and the Operation Group Co-ordinator in order to verify that
 121
 
all the shielding parts and protective covers have been put back in position. A protocol is then filled in,
signed by both parties and recorded in the Machine Operation Logbook.
 
3.5 PSS and Radiation Protection
 
The PSS (Personnel Safety System) is a hardwired, redundant system. The PSS provides the permits for
the different accelerator systems, allowing different operation modes. These modes are selected on a
safety key panel located in the Control Room. The tunnels are locked after the search has been made by
at least two operators. Entering any zone is always possible in Controlled Access, using a system of
safety keys, supervised by the Control Room.
As explained before, the main role of the Operation Group in terms of Radiation Protection, is
linked to the problem of induced activity inside the accelerator tunnels. During interventions under
Controlled Access, the Operators carry out the radiation measurements. For this purpose the Safety
Group provides the Control Room with radiation monitors (Eberline FH-40GL survey meters) and
operational dosimeters (Rados DIS-1 badges). Written safety procedures are available in the Control
Room.
 








Since all the main safety equipment is linked to the Control Room, the Operation Group is called to
react and participate in all safety related events. As well as being trained to be Machine Operators, in
the event of an emergency their skills and common sense will be invaluable to insure the safety of all
present on the ESRF site.
 
Year Fire Alarm Red phone Water Leak Lift failure Others
 
1997 30 (1 fire) 3 (2 serious) 0 1 1
1998 14 5 (5 serious) 1 1 0
1999 22 (1 fire) 5 (4 serious) 1 1 0
2000 41 (2 fires) 8 (4 serious) 3 1 1
